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In this article, the second of a series of four articles that engage critically with the 
arguments of two recent and significant additions to the literature on critical realism 
(Bhaskar’s Enlightened Common Sense: The Philosophy of Critical Realism and Bhaskar 
et al.’s Interdisciplinarity and Wellbeing: A Critical Realist General Theory of 
Interdisciplinarity), I present the results of a critical engagement with other categories of 
original or basic critical realism. Using the method of immanent critique and focusing 
mainly, but not exclusively, on the arguments of Enlightened Common Sense, I identify, 
and propose solutions to, a range of problems pertaining to the concepts of intransitivity, 
the domains of the real and the subjective, and the domain of the actual. In identifying 
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and resolving these problems, my aim is to clarify and develop the categories of original 
critical realism and thereby ensure that critical realism as a whole is as effective an 
underlabourer for science as it can be. 
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1. Introduction 
This is the second article in a series of four distinct, yet connected, articles that engage critically 
with the arguments of two recent and significant additions to an expanding corpus of academic 
work that both develops and draws on the philosophy of critical realism: Enlightened Common 
Sense: The Philosophy of Critical Realism (hereafter ECS) and Interdisciplinarity and 
Wellbeing: A Critical Realist General Theory of Interdisciplinarity (hereafter IW). In the 
introduction to the first article in this series, I commented on the degree of overlap between 
these two books, their value for those who are interested in studying the philosophy of critical 
realism, and the importance of resolving the conceptual problems that I have identified in them 
and, by implication, in some of Bhaskar’s earlier works. I argued that there is enough overlap, 
with respect to their content, to justify their joint consideration in the same article, despite the 
focus of ECS being the theory of critical realism and the focus of IW being the application of 
this theory to scientific practice. I argued, further, that the clarity and simplicity of ECS will be 
of value to those who are new to the philosophy of critical realism, while its enhancement of 
our understanding of the three core elements of this philosophy – original or basic critical 
realism, dialectical critical realism, and the philosophy of metaReality – will be of value to 
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more experienced scholars. Finally, I argued that, if critical realism as a whole is to be an 
effective underlabourer for science, we must ensure that we resolve any conceptual problems 
that we find within it. 
 
My aim in this article is the same as it was in the first article in this series: that is, to resolve a 
range of conceptual problems – for example, illicit conceptual identification, conceptual 
absence, and contradictory conceptual definition – that I have detected, using the method of 
immanent critique, in the arguments of ECS and IW and, by implication, in the arguments of 
Bhaskar’s earlier works.1 Again, by suggesting how these conceptual problems might be 
resolved (through, for example, taxonomic statement and re-statement of the relations between 
concepts, which involves both conceptual differentiation and conceptual integration), I show 
not only how our understanding of other categories of original critical realism might be clarified 
but also how this understanding might be developed.2 Again, I approach the question of 
identifying and resolving such problems from the perspective of dialectical critical realism to 
ensure that there is a coherent relationship between the categories of original and the categories 
of dialectical critical realism.3  
 
I emphasize that my aim in this article is to clarify and develop the core categories of original 
critical realism; it is not to reconstruct them.4 My argument does not amount to reconstruction 
because, in my view, reconstruction would involve transforming the ontological basis of critical 
realism. On the contrary, I accept as legitimate the ontological position of critical realism but 
try to strengthen that position by removing what I think is problematic about it. In this way, I 
attempt to remain in sympathy with Bhaskar’s approach to philosophical inquiry and the overall 
aim of his philosophical project, which, as I indicated in the introduction to the first article, is 
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to underlabour for science and, more generally, ‘projects of human emancipation’ (Bhaskar 
2011, 2). 
 
I have organized my argument as follows. In Section 2, I clarify the distinctions between, as 
well as the connections of, the concepts of intransitivity and transitivity, ontology and 
epistemology, and being and knowledge, taking the discussion of intransitivity in Chapter 3 of 
ECS and Chapter 4 of IW as my starting point. I argue that these conceptual pairings should not 
be identified with each other in a simple way. At the same time, I introduce, and defend, a 
distinction between the epistemic fallacy and the epistemological fallacy. In Sections 3 and 4, 
I present, not only a clarification but also an expansion of our understanding of the three 
domains of reality. Thus, in Section 3, I argue that the domain of the real should be expanded 
to encompass the reality of superstructures as well as structures and that this necessitates a 
reconceptualization of the content of the domain of the real and, by implication, the content of 
the domain of the subjective. In Section 4, I turn to the domain of the actual, arguing that it is a 
mistake to assume that an event is only an effect and not also a type of cause. I argue that events 
are triggering causes, as well as the effects of causal objects in operation, and that, in the social 
world, they are both triggering and modifying causes to the extent that they are experienced and 
thus mediated by human subjectivity. I argue, further, that we can use this understanding of 
events to make sense of the definition of the concept of ‘“nexus”’ that Bhaskar introduced in 
Chapter 2 of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation and, by implication, the four cases 
of determination of events that are reproduced in Chapter 4 of ECS. In the final section of the 
article, I summarize my argument. 
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2. Intransitivity 
In Chapter 3.2 of ECS, Bhaskar writes that ‘there are thus three new kinds of ontological 
distance or depth in transcendental realism, which I now explicate more fully’ (47). I want to 
comment on Bhaskar’s explication of one of these kinds of depth – intransitivity – and also 
bring into consideration the discussion of it that is to be found in Chapter 4 of IW. 
 
In relation to science, intransitivity is the idea that the objects of scientific inquiry exist 
independently of scientists. From a philosophical perspective, it entails that questions about the 
nature of reality (ontology) cannot be reduced to questions about the nature and limits of our 
knowledge of reality (epistemology), and enables us to make sense of the reality of ‘scientific 
discontinuity and change’ (Bhaskar 2009, 51). Now, in Chapter 3.2 of ECS Bhaskar tells us that 
the ‘Western philosophical tradition has mistakenly and anthropocentrically reduced the 
question of what is to the question of what we can know. This is the epistemic fallacy, 
epitomised by concepts like the empirical world’ (47). Similarly, in Chapter 4 of IW the authors 
write: 
 
In terms of the first objective [‘that we want to be able to say something about the world, 
i.e. that we want to be able to “do” a philosophical ontology’], this argument [about the 
conditions of possibility of scientific experiment] suggests a critique of the epistemic 
fallacy, that is, the reduction of being to knowledge, or the reduction of ontological to 
epistemological questions. The epistemic fallacy is the assumption that you can always 
analyse “being” in terms of “our knowledge of being”. (28) 
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I want to propose that ‘the reduction of being to knowledge’ is distinct from, although still 
connected to, ‘the reduction of ontological to epistemological questions’ or the reduction of 
‘the question of what is to the question of what we can know.’ Both the former and latter are 
usually treated by critical realists as alternative definitions of the epistemic fallacy. However, 
if it is accepted that the term epistemic refers to knowledge (considered as an entity) and the 
term epistemological refers to the study of the nature and limits of knowledge, the former 
statement (‘the reduction of being to knowledge’) ought to be treated as defining the epistemic 
fallacy and the latter statement (‘the reduction of ontological to epistemological questions’) 
ought to be treated as defining what I am going to call the epistemological fallacy. Although 
the epistemic fallacy is distinct from the epistemological fallacy, the two are connected in the 
sense that the study of the nature and limits of knowledge must, by definition, include some 
sort of conception of the nature and limits of knowledge. It follows that to commit the 
epistemological fallacy is to commit, at the same time, the epistemic fallacy. The close 
relationship between these two fallacies may explain why hitherto critical realists have not 
distinguished between them clearly.5 
 
It is important that we distinguish between the epistemological and the epistemic fallacy 
because, if we do not, we may conclude that only philosophers, who ask questions about the 
nature and limits of knowledge (amongst other things), commit the epistemic fallacy. This is 
an untenable conclusion because, although the arguments of philosophers may presuppose the 
reduction of ontology to epistemology and, by implication, the reduction of being to knowledge, 
scientists may also advance arguments that presuppose the reduction of being to knowledge – 
for example, those scientists who assume that social reality is constituted by how we talk and 
who thereby erase the distinction between reality and the language that we use to describe it. 
(This is the linguistic fallacy, a specific form of the epistemic fallacy.) 
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Re-consideration of the epistemic fallacy takes me to the distinction between the concepts of 
transitivity and intransitivity, which Bhaskar first proposed in A Realist Theory of Science as a 
way of avoiding committing the epistemic fallacy (2008a, 17). Now, in Chapter 3.2 of ECS 
Bhaskar tells us that ‘the most important distinction is between the intransitive and transitive 
dimensions as such, ontology and epistemology’ (47). Hartwig, similarly, tells us that ‘the ID 
[Intransitive Dimension] is synonymous with ONTOLOGY’ and that ‘[t]he TD [Transitive 
Dimension] … is synonymous with the epistemological process of any inquiry’ (2007, 264); 
and the authors of IW, in Chapter 13, refer to one of the advantages of critical realism as ‘its 
layered version of (intransitive) ontology’ and write that ‘because critical realism acknowledges 
that ontology is distinct from epistemology, it also creates a space for the social component of 
knowledge (the transitive dimension)’ (135). However, I want to raise a note of caution here. 
In relation to science, the terms ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ refer to two distinct, yet 
connected, dimensions of scientific inquiry in the sense that anything within the transitive 
dimension ‘may, by valid PERSPECTIVAL SWITCH, be seen as continually passing over into the 
intransitive, without annulling the distinction’ (Hartwig 2007, 265). (In other words, taken 
together the intransitive and transitive dimensions constitute a constellational identity.) 
However, the transitive and intransitive dimensions cannot be synonymous with ontology and 
epistemology, as Bhaskar, Hartwig, and the authors of IW suggest, because the latter pair of 
concepts refer, on the one hand, to different branches of philosophical inquiry (the study of the 
nature of reality and the study of the nature and limits of knowledge, respectively) and, on the 
other hand, to a specific conception of reality (for example, empirical realist) and of knowledge 
(for example, empiricist), respectively.6  
 
It is important, I think, to distinguish clearly between the intransitive and transitive dimensions 
of science on the one hand and ontology and epistemology on the other because, if the former 
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pair of concepts are treated as synonymous with the latter, there is a danger of confusing the 
intransitive and transitive dimensions of science with the intransitive and transitive dimensions 
of reality, given that one of the meanings of ontology is the study of reality. Hartwig, for 
example, does not distinguish clearly, in his discussion of the principles of intransitivity and 
transitivity, between the intransitive and transitive dimensions of science and of reality. 
Certainly, this distinction is presupposed by his claim that the transitive dimension ‘logically 
must be extended to incorporate everything currently being affected by human praxis’ and by 
his claim that it ‘is synonymous … with the epistemological process, encompassing everything 
imbricated with human praxis and currently being affected by it’ (2007, 264). However, if the 
transitive dimension of reality is to encompass ‘everything imbricated with human praxis and 
currently being affected by it’, it cannot be limited to the social and epistemic processes of 
scientific inquiry, which Hartwig alludes to in his second claim, but must be extended to include 
all types of social and epistemic process, as well as the structures and superstructures that are 
their pre-conditions.7  
 
In short, the concepts of scientific intransitivity and transitivity, which are established through 
an act of referential detachment pertaining to science, are more specific instances of the general 
principles of intransitivity and transitivity than are the concepts of existential intransitivity and 
transitivity, which are established through any act of referential detachment (such as making a 
cup of tea). In other words, existential intransitivity and transitivity constellationally contain 
scientific intransitivity and transitivity. Bhaskar writes, in Chapter 3.2 of ECS, that the objects 
of scientific inquiry exist ‘independently of their discovery; this is existential intransitivity’ 
(47). A more accurate statement would be that this is a definition of scientific intransitivity, 
which is a specific instance of existential intransitivity. 
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Moreover, just as I would urge caution about using the concepts of ontology and epistemology 
as synonyms for the intransitive and transitive dimensions of science, respectively, so I would 
urge caution about using the concepts of being and knowledge as synonyms for the intransitive 
and transitive dimensions of science, respectively. In his explication of the principle of 
intransitivity, in Chapter 3.2 of ECS, Bhaskar comes close to treating being and knowledge as 
synonyms for the intransitive and transitive dimensions of science. However, in my view, 
knowledge ought not to be treated as a synonym for the transitive dimension of science because, 
although knowledge is part of the transitive dimension of scientific inquiry, in the sense that it 
is one of the conditions for scientific inquiry (whose other conditions include social structures 
of knowledge production), it is also the outcome of scientific inquiry. Hence, the consequence 
of treating the transitive dimension of science as synonymous with knowledge is to reduce a 
social to an epistemic process and to beg further questions about the conditions in which our 
knowledge of reality develops.8   
 
Moreover, in his explication of the principles of intransitivity and transitivity, Hartwig appears 
to conflate the concept of knowledge with the concept of transitivity, distinguishing, for 
example, between ‘transitive and intransitive objects of knowledge’ (2007, 265). This is 
problematic because, to re-describe a ‘cognitive object (existing knowledge, theories, models, 
etc.)’ as a transitive object of knowledge is tautological (Hartwig 2007, 265). A cognitive object 
is a transitive object because it is something that changes but, since it changes only through the 
process of scientific inquiry, and since it is one of the conditions for, as well as being the 
outcome, of scientific inquiry, it makes more sense to re-describe a cognitive object as a 
transitive object of science and to distinguish it from an intransitive object of science. 
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Hartwig, following Bhaskar’s argument in A Realist Theory of Science, also describes a 
‘cognitive object’ as ‘the relatively changing … MATERIAL CAUSE of knowledge’ (2007, 265).9 
However, if the argument of Section 3 of the first article in this series is accepted, a cognitive 
object can be a type of superstructural form, having a material root or base to which it is 
irreducible (the natural or social objects that fall into the intransitive domain of scientific 
inquiry) but being, essentially, conceptual. Since superstructural forms are causal objects, we 
may re-describe a cognitive object that is a superstructural form as the conceptual cause of 
scientific inquiry, with social structures (and their higher-order derivatives) as the material 
cause of scientific inquiry. 
 
It follows that, if knowledge ought not to be treated as synonymous with the transitive 
dimension of science, being ought not to be treated as synonymous with the intransitive 
dimension of science. By definition, being includes both that which falls into the transitive 
dimension and that which falls into the intransitive dimension whereas, by definition, the 
intransitive dimension of science excludes that part of reality which falls into the transitive 
dimension. In short, if the distinction between the transitive and intransitive dimensions of 
science presupposes the non-identity of being and knowledge, we cannot treat the concept of 
being as synonymous with the concept of intransitivity.  
 
Finally, we must remember that ontology should not be treated as synonymous with being and 
that epistemology should not be treated as synonymous with knowledge. However, in his 
explication of the principle of intransitivity, in Chapter 3.2 of ECS, Bhaskar comes close to 
treating being and knowledge as synonyms, not only for the intransitive and transitive 
dimensions of science but also for ontology and epistemology, respectively:10  
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But the most important distinction is between the intransitive and transitive dimensions 
as such, ontology and epistemology. Failure to distinguish them results among other 
things in the reification of the fallible products of science. Of course, being contains, 
but it is not reducible to knowledge, experience or any other human attribute or product. 
The domain of the real is distinct from, and greater than the domain of the empirical. 
(47) 
 
Treating the concepts of ontology and reality as synonymous is a mistake that the authors of IW 
occasionally make. In Chapter 7, for example, where they discuss the concept of alethic truth, 
they argue ‘that the alethic truth of green grass is that grass contains chlorophyll, which reflects 
the green component of the light spectrum. This more basic structure is part of ontology; it is 
what makes ontology stratified’ (58; my emphasis). Furthermore, commenting on the possibility 
of contradictions between philosophical theory and scientific practice, the authors of IW 
conclude that 
 
the empirical scientist who happens to be an empiricist will understand that 
 empiricism must give way to a more adequate philosophy of science along the lines of 
 the critical realist analysis of laws based on an understanding of ontology as structured 
 and differentiated. (59; my emphasis) 
 
I suggest that, in both passages, ‘ontology’ should be replaced with ‘reality’ because the context 
indicates that the authors are thinking, not of our theory of reality as being ‘stratified’ and 
‘structured and differentiated’ but reality itself. (Likewise, epistemology refers to our theory of 
knowledge and therefore must not be confused with the intransitive object of a branch of 
philosophical inquiry – that is, knowledge.) By referring to ontology, rather than reality, the 
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authors are in danger of committing the epistemic fallacy – that is, of reducing reality to our 
(philosophical) theories of it. 
 
The confusion of the concepts of ontology and reality is also evident in the discussion of ‘being 
as totality’, in Chapter 7 of IW, where the authors tell us that ‘[n]ormic statements … are about 
the ontological non-empirical level of reality, and they assume that reality is ontologically 
structured’ (66; my emphasis). Here, the addition of ‘ontological’ and ‘ontologically’ is 
superfluous and obscures the distinction between the (intransitive) object of philosophical 
inquiry – that is, the nature of reality – and the (transitive) product of that inquiry (an ontology 
or theory of reality). Likewise, when they discuss ‘being as incorporating reflexivity’, the 
authors of IW write that ‘mismatches between theory and praxis simply are ontological; they 
are not just subjective or only in the mind. They would exist even if there were no human beings 
to see them’ (71; my emphasis). However, although ‘theory’ and ‘praxis’, considered only as 
concepts, may be described as ‘ontological’, their function as concepts is to refer to, and express 
the truth of, something real. Hence, it makes more sense, given the context of this passage, to 
say that such ‘mismatches’ are real. Similarly, in Chapter 8, the authors of IW discuss neo-
Kantianism and the ‘problem of induction’ and conclude that ‘[o]nce it is clear that reality is 
ontologically structured in this manner, then the problem of induction falls away’ (79; my 
emphasis). Once again, the inclusion of ‘ontologically’ confuses ontology with reality. Finally, 
in Chapter 13, where the authors discuss the hierarchy of research methods and the reason for 
the assumption ‘that qualitative methods do not generate valid knowledge’, they refer to 
‘ignorance about ontology, i.e. ontological ignorance (ontology is not exhausted by the 
empirical level of reality, and knowledge about real, non-empirical ontological structures and 
mechanisms can only be grasped via qualitative methods)’ (131; my emphasis). Yet, in this 
context, it is reality, not ‘ontology’, that is ‘not exhausted by the empirical level’; and, in this 
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context, ‘structures and mechanisms’ are not ‘ontological’ – they just are real, ‘non-empirical’ 
objects. 
 
We may summarize the preceding argument as a series of relations of non-equivalence or non-
identity, as in Figure 1 below. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The crucial point is that, although each conceptual pairing is a constellational identity, each one 
must be distinguished clearly from, and thus must not be treated as synonymous or identified 
simply with, the others. 
 
By thinking of the relations between these conceptual pairings in this way, we can resolve a 
problem with the argument of Chapter 4 of IW. In their discussion of the epistemic fallacy, the 
authors tell us that the  
 
 transitive dimension is that aspect of knowledge that involves people and their beliefs, 
 or scientists and their theories. From the point of view of the transitive dimension, the 
 scientist’s work proceeds by the critique and transformation of pre-existing social 
 products. Science is therefore a commodity, and like other commodities, it is part of 
 the social world. (28) 
 
Now, this definition of transitivity in relation to science is problematic for at least four reasons. 
First, it confuses science, a historically specific and contextually dependent form of human 
inquiry, with its product and one of its conditions – that is, knowledge. Hence, second, it is 
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knowledge, not science, that is a commodity. However, third, the commodification of 
knowledge is a historically specific, not a universal, phenomenon: it is necessary within the 
context of a capitalist system of production since this sort of system is governed by a logic of 
commodification, but it would not be necessary, if the system of production were governed by 
a logic of satisfying human needs. Fourth, since the intransitive dimension of science is 
constituted through an act of referential detachment, it may also be said to involve people. 
However, what distinguishes the transitive from the intransitive dimension of science is what 
people do: transforming pre-existing knowledge in the former dimension and referentially 
detaching part of reality, which becomes the object of inquiry, in the latter. Finally, the authors 
define the intransitive dimension as the ‘world which exists independently of people and their 
beliefs’ (28). However, their definition of (existential) intransitivity is problematic because 
what they have defined here is the principle of transcendental realism, which is the condition 
for the act of referential detachment; it is through this act that scientists determine the content 
of the intransitive dimension of their inquiry. 
 
3. The domains of the real and the subjective 
In Section 3 of the first article in this series, I argued that superstructural forms are functionally 
emergent, ideational entities. I argued, further, that, because superstructural forms make a 
difference to the exercise of human subjectivity and agency, they must be recognized as causal 
objects in their own right, just as social structures and their higher-order derivatives must be. It 
follows from this argument that the domain of the real ought to be expanded to include, not 
only entities that have a material function but also entities that have a conceptual and semiotic 
function. Let me justify this conclusion. 
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An expansion of the domain of the real is necessary because, hitherto, critical realists have 
conceived this domain, implicitly, as populated by only one type of causal object – that is, 
structures.11  This is not surprising, given the way in which critical realism emerged: first, from 
a transcendental inquiry into the conditions of possibility of scientific experiment, which 
established that the natural world must be structured (Bhaskar 2008a); and, second, from a 
similar sort of inquiry into the properties that social objects must possess for them to be possible 
objects of knowledge (Bhaskar 1998). The latter form of enquiry established that social reality 
must also be structured and that, as causal objects, social structures are distinct from (although 
still connected to) people, who are, in turn, causal objects, possessing the properties of human 
agency and subjectivity. 
 
Now, it is true that ‘Bhaskar later changed the domain of the empirical to that of “the 
subjective”, to embrace concepts as well as the empirical’ (Hartwig 2007, 401); since the 
domain of the subjective is a subset of the domain of the real, it may be argued, then, that the 
domain of the real already encompasses the conceptual.12 However, to introduce the conceptual 
into the domain of the real via the concept of human subjectivity is to include the conceptual 
only in so far as it pertains to the ideas that people generate through the exercise of their 
subjectivity and agency (beliefs, understandings, etc.). Hence, if it is accepted that 
superstructural forms constitute a transcendentally necessary domain of social reality, these 
forms (some of which are conceptual entities) must be included, as a type of causal object, in 
the domain of the real, alongside structures.  
 
Of course, none of this is to deny the necessity of re-categorizing the domain of the empirical 
as the domain of the subjective. This is long overdue not least because, within the original 
conceptualization of the domains of reality, human experience was confined within the domain 
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of the empirical.13 However, if our experiences of events include the detection, via the process 
of sensation, not only of external but also of internal stimuli, we should not classify human 
experience as ‘empirical’. Of course, we can understand why Bhaskar should have adopted this 
classification because it was against empiricism and the doctrine of ‘esse est percipi’ that he 
was arguing in his earlier works (Bhaskar 1998, 2). However, if I am right and there is more to 
human experience than that which empiricism presupposes, we should re-categorize the domain 
of the empirical as the domain of the subjective and include within it, for example, not only our 
interpretation of sensory information (the perceptual) but also what we think about (the 
cognitive), what we feel (the emotive), what we desire (the conative), as well as the meanings 
that we convey to others (the linguistic). These are just some of the different dimensions of 
human subjectivity that determine how we experience reality.  
 
One implication of re-categorizing the domain of the empirical as the domain of the subjective, 
then, is that we should include, within the latter domain, thoughts rather than concepts since it 
is through cognition, one of the lower-order processes of the mind and thus one of the 
dimensions of human subjectivity, that we generate thoughts. Of course, we cannot think 
without concepts but that is why I argued, in Section 3 of the first article, that conceptual 
emergent entities are part of the conditions for the exercise of human subjectivity and agency. 
Therefore, I suggest that we reserve application of the term ‘conceptual’ for the analytical 
differentiation of causal objects within the domain of the real and for the analytical distinction 
between a (type of) superstructural form (a conceptual emergent entity) and what this 
superstructural form generates in people – that is, the content of their thoughts – when they 
exercise their lower-order powers of mind, such as cognition.  
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That Bhaskar should have included concepts within the domain of the subjective is not 
surprising because rationalist philosophy, which presupposes the ontology of conceptual 
realism, has been an object of immanent critique in his work, just as empiricist philosophy, 
which presupposes the ontology of empirical realism, has been. Indeed, we can now see that, 
with rationalism and empiricism, not only is reality reduced to human experience, whether this 
is one of thinking (rationalism) or perceiving (empiricism), but it is also reduced to specific 
dimensions of human subjectivity – to the cognitive and the perceptual, respectively.14  
 
A second implication of re-categorizing the domain of the empirical as the domain of the 
subjective is that we should include within it (alongside thoughts) meanings rather than signs 
since it is through exercising our higher-order powers of mind, such as intelligence, that we 
produce meanings.15 However, we cannot convey meanings without using a signifier of some 
sort, and that is why I argued, in Section 3 of the first article, that semiotic emergent entities are 
also part of the conditions for the exercise of human subjectivity and agency. In short, if we 
draw on pre-existing concepts to give content to our thoughts, we draw on pre-existing means 
of representation (that is, signifiers) to express what we are thinking about as signs. 
 
A third implication of re-categorizing the domain of the empirical as the domain of the 
subjective is that, as with the term conceptual (and, by implication, the terms semiotic and 
material), we should reserve application of the term empirical for the analytical differentiation 
of the real – that is, when referring to the difference between real objects that we can detect 
through our senses and objects that we cannot detect through our senses but that are still real 
by virtue of the effect that they have on us when we are exercising our higher-order powers of 
mind. In other words, if what is empirical is something that is external to us, we should not 
include the empirical within the domain of the subjective, which is the province of the detection 
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(via sensation) of stimuli (whether external or internal) and the interpretation of sensory 
information (via perception), but should include it within the domain of the real on the grounds 
that our experiences of reality depend (in part) on the existence of external stimuli – that is, 
objects that exist apart from us. We can then make the distinction between the empirical part of 
reality, which we can detect through our senses, and the non-empirical part, which we cannot.  
 
In short, the differentiation of the domain of the real, by application of the terms material, 
conceptual, semiotic, and empirical, has a different rationale from, and therefore should not be 
confused with, the differentiation of reality into the domains of the real and the subjective. Our 
use of the terms material, conceptual, semiotic, and empirical, with respect to the differentiation 
of the domain of the real, enables us to distinguish between (a) different types of causal object 
and (b) parts of reality that can be detected via the senses and parts that cannot be; while our 
differentiation of reality into domains of the real and the subjective enables us to acknowledge 
that reality encompasses, but cannot be reduced to, human subjectivity. 
 
4. The domain of the actual 
The presupposition of my argument concerning the relationship between the domains of the 
real and subjective is that, because human subjectivity is only a part of reality, the domain of 
the subjective is a subset of the domain of the real. However, to follow the logic of Bhaskar’s 
argument and to take into account the possibility that an event may not be experienced, we 
should say that the domain of the subjective is a subset of the domain of the actual, which, in 
turn, is a subset of the domain of the real. Hence, it is to the domain of the actual, and its 
relationship to the domain of the real, that I turn because, just as there is more to be said about 
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the content of the domain of the subjective, so there is more to be said about the content of the 
domain of the actual. 
 
Hartwig reminds us ‘that events and experiences are no less real than mechanisms and 
experiences no less actual than events’ (2007, 401). Now, this statement begs the question of 
in what respect events and experiences are real. In Hartwig’s view, ‘[e]vents and experiences 
are embraced by the real in so far as they function as mechanisms, e.g. a war may contribute to 
the formation of a psychic structure generative of post-traumatic stress disorder’ (2007, 401). I 
want to call into question this claim because it seems to me that it presupposes the reduction of 
the content of the domain of the real to mechanisms. Hartwig repeats this mistake, when he tells 
us that ‘[t]he distinction between the domains of events and experiences, on the one hand, and 
mechanisms on the other does not coincide with that between the transitive (epistemological) 
and INTRANSITIVE (ONTOLOGICAL) dimensions of reality’ (2007, 401).16 Here, Hartwig is 
identifying the distinction between (a) events and experiences and (b) mechanisms with the 
distinction between (a) the domain of the actual and (b) the domain of the real. However, if the 
domain of the actual is a subset of the domain of the real and if events and our experiences of 
them are not the same as the mechanisms that generate them, we cannot identify the distinction 
between (a) events and experiences and (b) mechanisms with the distinction between (a) the 
domain of the actual and (b) the domain of the real. 
 
I want to propose that events and our experiences of them are real, not because ‘they function 
as mechanisms’ but because (a) they are effects – that is, outcomes of the operation of 
mechanisms or the ways of working of structures (and their higher-order derivatives) and of 
superstructures and because (b) they can be causes, even though they are not mechanisms. In 
other words, it is a mistake in my view to assume that (i) an event is only an effect and not also 
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a type of cause and (ii) only mechanisms are causal.17 That critical realists should have made 
these assumptions is understandable, given the way in which Bhaskar developed the ontology 
of transcendental realism – that is, by means of transcendental investigation into the conditions 
of possibility of scientific experiment. However, as we shall see, maintaining these assumptions 
not only inhibits our understanding of reality and causation but also is inconsistent with 
arguments that Bhaskar made in later work – for example, his examination of the concrete in 
Chapter 2 of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. 
 
How, then, can events be causes? In the natural world, for example, a sudden drop in 
temperature overnight is an event that, ceteris paribus, leads to the formation of ice on a road 
that is covered in water. Similarly, in the social world, an arsonist striking a match is an event 
that, ceteris paribus, leads to the combustion of materials constituting the match and the 
appearance of a naked flame. In other words, events can be causes in the sense of being triggers 
for the activation of mechanisms: in the former example, the crystallization of water molecules; 
in the latter example, an exothermic and chemiluminescent reaction. However, it is important 
to remember that, although an event can be a triggering cause, it is also an effect because it is 
itself caused. Hence, in the former example, the sudden drop in air temperature is the result of 
the operation of mechanisms in the atmosphere, while, in the latter example, the striking of the 
match by the arsonist is the result of the operation of mechanisms pertaining to the human body, 
the human mind, and the social context of the human agent, all of which enable a person to 
form an intention to commit arson and to realize that intention. 
 
However, I suggest that there is a significant difference between events in the natural world and 
events in the social world, with respect to the possibility of their becoming triggering causes. 
In the social world, unlike in the natural world, an event can be a triggering cause, only if it is 
This is the accepted version of an article that has been published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of 
Critical Realism and that is available online at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14767430.2019.1600122  
 
experienced by a person. What I mean by the experiencing of an event in the social world is a 
complex process of (intersubjective) mediation involving, at a minimum, the activation of 
lower-order powers of the mind, which enable people to perceive and interpret an event in 
relation to their knowledge (however fallible) of the social context of the event and the 
activation of higher-order powers (such as intentionality) which enable them to decide how to 
respond. Moreover, for an event in the social world to become a triggering cause, it must be the 
effect of an action undertaken by a person who is different from the person who perceives and 
interprets it and whose response may, in turn, become a triggering condition. 
 
Hence, in social scientific analysis, it is possible to identify a series or chain of events, where 
the common element linking the events and turning an effect into a cause is the exercise of 
human subjectivity. For example, the development of a liquidity problem at Northern Rock (a 
UK bank) in August 2007 led to the Bank of England setting up a Liquidity Support Facility 
for Northern Rock in September 2007, public knowledge of which led to fears among the bank’s 
retail depositors that they would lose their money and thenceforth to hasty withdrawals of 
deposits. The run on Northern Rock, in turn, led to the UK Government (acting via HM 
Treasury and the Bank of England) offering to guarantee the value of all retail deposits in 
Northern Rock, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) extending the terms of the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme, and the Bank of England injecting liquidity into the financial 
markets. These policy interventions, in turn, had the effect of restoring confidence among 
depositors and of helping the bank to resolve its liquidity problem.  
 
Of course, the series of actions that the directors and depositors of Northern Rock and UK 
financial policy makers took in the autumn of 2007 is not the full causal story because 
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underlying the decisions that these social actors made was a specific social context comprising, 
at a minimum 
 
(a) an international capitalist system of production, of which financial markets are an integral 
part; 
(b) a system of government in the UK that includes mechanisms of economic intervention – for 
example, at that time, the tripartite framework of co-operation between HM Treasury, the Bank 
of England, and the Financial Services Authority; 
(c) superstructures defining the role of government within a capitalist social order (the ideology 
of neo-liberalism) and enabling policy makers to render meaningful events occurring with a 
capitalist social order (the discourse of UK financial policy making). 
 
In short, to understand why the directors of Northern Rock found themselves short of liquidity 
in August 2007, we would have to extend the chain of events backwards to take into account 
the freezing of international financial markets in August 2007 (which prevented the bank from 
obtaining the funding that it needed for its operations); developments in the trading of financial 
assets (otherwise known as securitisation), in which Northern Rock participated; and changes 
to the regulation of financial market actors (through the passing of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000), which permitted Northern Rock to implement a high-risk business model. 
 
Therefore, contrary to Hartwig’s claim that ‘[e]vents and experiences … function as 
mechanisms’, it is not an experience of an event that is a mechanism since this experience 
depends on the operation of a conjunction of mechanisms – namely, those pertaining to the 
person who experiences the event and those pertaining to the context in which that person 
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exercises higher-order powers of the mind (intentionality, reflexivity, intelligence, sapience, 
etc.); and it is not an event that is a mechanism because (a) an event is an effect of the operation 
of a mechanism or conjunction of mechanisms and (b) if it is experienced by a person, it may 
become the cause of, or trigger for, the activation of other mechanisms. 
 
I want to use my argument about the nature of events and our experiences of them to refine our 
understanding of the concept of ‘“nexus”’ that Bhaskar first introduced in Chapter 2 of Scientific 
Realism and Human Emancipation and that is the correlative of the concept of ‘“system”’ that 
Bhaskar discusses in the same work (2009, 109). Both concepts re-appear in Figure 4.1 in ECS 
(81).18 Now, Bhaskar’s definition of the concept of nexus is somewhat contradictory because, 
on the one hand, he defines it as ‘a combination of aspects (or facets) of an event, etc.’ and, on 
the other hand, he tells us that ‘[i]n general the determination of events within a system will 
result in their constitution as a nexus’ (2009, 109). In other words, on the one hand a nexus is 
supposed to be a re-description of a single event and on the other hand a nexus is supposed to 
be a description of the mutual relations between multiple events. I suggest that we adopt the 
latter rather than the former definition of the concept of nexus because Bhaskar’s intention, it 
seems, at least in this part of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, is to acknowledge 
the possibility that the effects of different mechanisms, whether these mechanisms are 
organized into a system or not, will be modified relationally; and such an argument presupposes 
that (a) the effect of a mechanism is an event and (b) this event can be a triggering condition 
for, and modifying cause of, the operation of a different mechanism whose effect may, in turn, 
become a modifying cause.19  
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The specific way in which the crisis at Northern Rock unfolded in 2007, as a sequence of events 
(Figure 2), demonstrates how events within a nexus can modify the operation of mechanisms 
that are part of a social system (in this case the capitalist system of production). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
In the early stages of the crisis (August 2007), the lack of liquidity (E1), which was the effect 
of the freezing of the mechanisms of international financial trading and lending and borrowing 
(M1), especially within the markets for securitised financial assets and wholesale money (two 
of Northern Rock’s four funding streams), triggered a change in the content of the mechanism 
of UK financial policy making (M2), from a policy of regulating financial markets to a policy 
of both regulating and intervening in financial markets. However, when this change in financial 
policy became public knowledge (September 2007), it had the effect of triggering multiple 
withdrawals of money by Northern Rock’s retail depositors, who were fearful that, if the bank 
were to collapse, they would lose their money (E2). The run on Northern Rock, in turn, triggered 
the activation of the Liquidity Support Facility by the Bank of England (M3), the 
implementation of a retail deposit scheme by HM Treasury (M4), the injection of extra liquidity 
into the financial markets by the Bank of England (M5), and an extension to the terms of the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme by the FSA (M6). The effect of the operation of these 
mechanisms (M3 to M6) was to resolve the liquidity problem at Northern Rock, at least 
temporarily.20  
 
Therefore, we can see that 
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• E1 (the lack of liquidity) was a modifying cause because experience of this event, by 
UK financial policy makers, led to a modification of the content of the mechanism of 
financial policy making; 
• E2 (the bank run) was a modifying cause because experience of this event, by UK 
financial officials, triggered activation of a specific form of lending of last resort by the 
Bank of England (a Liquidity Support Facility), the implementation of a specific form 
of guarantee scheme by HM Treasury and the Bank of England (one tailored to retail 
bank depositors), the injection of extra liquidity into the financial markets via 
modification of the Bank of England’s standard open market operations, and the 
modification of the terms of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme by the FSA.21  
 
We should note from this example that an event in the social world becomes a modifying cause, 
only when it is mediated by human subjectivity; thus, it is the interpretation of an event, such 
as the lack of liquidity at Northern Rock, by the relevant social actors that turns the effect of 
the operation of one mechanism (M1) into a cause that modifies the operation and therefore the 
effects of other mechanisms (M3 to M6). Bhaskar does not make this clear, either in Chapter 2 
of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation or in Chapter 4 of ECS. However, it is vital that 
we understand this because, if we fail to acknowledge the role of human subjectivity, we will 
be in danger of reifying social mechanisms and their effects and, in consequence, of assuming 
a regular relationship of cause and effect between events. In the case of Northern Rock, if these 
relationships had been regular, the chain of events that unfolded would have been pre-
determined. However, as a reading of the House of Commons Treasury Committee’s report on 
the crisis reveals, the actors involved had decisions to make about what course(s) of actions to 
take as events unfolded and could have acted differently.22 For example,  
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• the directors of Northern Rock had decisions to make about how to resolve the problem 
of liquidity at the bank (before this led to a problem of insolvency) – in particular, 
whether or not to securitise the bank’s debt, whether or not to sell the business, and 
whether or not to use the Bank of England as lender of last resort, given their 
understanding of their legal obligations to the bank’s shareholders; 
• Bank of England officials had decisions to make, following the request for financial 
support by the directors of Northern Rock, about how to maintain the stability of the 
UK financial system – in particular, whether or not to act as lender of last resort to 
Northern Rock and whether or not to modify the Bank’s open market operations to inject 
extra liquidity into the financial markets, given their understanding of the potential for 
adverse consequences to arise in the financial markets (‘moral hazard’); 
• HM Treasury officials had decisions to make, following the request for financial support 
from the Bank of England by the directors of Northern Rock, about how to maintain the 
stability of the UK financial system – in particular, whether or not to authorise the Bank 
of England to act as lender of last resort and whether or not to offer a guarantee to 
Northern Rock’s retail depositors, given their understanding of the potential risk to the 
taxpayer and the potential for adverse consequences to arise in the financial markets 
(‘moral hazard’); 
• FSA officials had a decision to make, following the implementation of the retail deposit 
guarantee scheme by HM Treasury, about how to maintain the stability of the UK 
financial system – in particular, whether or not to modify the terms of the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme, given their understanding of the potential for adverse 
consequences to arise in the financial markets (‘moral hazard’); 
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• Northern Rock’s retail depositors had a decision to make, when the establishment of the 
Bank of England’s Liquidity Support Facility became public knowledge, about whether 
or not to withdraw their money from the bank, given their understanding of the risk of 
the bank collapsing. 
 
In short, there were real, alternative courses of action that each group of actors could have taken. 
Government officials could have, for example, refused support for Northern Rock, leaving it at 
risk of collapse. But the fact that they did not take this course of action does not mean that they 
had no choice in the matter. In other words, the chain of events unfolded in a certain way, but 
it did not have to unfold that way: if the actors involved had made different decisions, there 
would have been a different chain of events with different outcomes. 
 
Note that my discussion of causation in relation to the crisis at Northern Rock constitutes an 
implicit critique of much of the research that social scientists (mainly political economists) 
undertook in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-08. To the extent that this work 
analysed the causes of the crisis, it tended to focus on structural conditions (especially financial 
markets and regulation), superstructural conditions (such as discourses of financial policy 
making) and personal conditions (such as the competencies of social actors); see, for example, 
Foster and Magdoff (2009) and Friedman (2011). Now the implication of my argument about 
causation is that, in the case of the financial crisis of 2007-08 (which, it is arguable, was just 
one aspect of a much wider crisis of capitalism), this phenomenon ought to be conceived, not 
as a single event, but as a chain of events, where the events are recognized as being not only 
the effects of the operation of mechanisms but also causes that modified the operation of those 
mechanisms. Because it is the exercise of human subjectivity that turns an event in the social 
realm into a modifying cause and because the exercise of human subjectivity is a condition for 
This is the accepted version of an article that has been published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of 
Critical Realism and that is available online at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14767430.2019.1600122  
 
the exercise of human agency, understanding how events in the social realm can become causes 
ought to help social scientists to understand the interplay of social context and social action and 
to avoid problematic explanations – that is, ones that consider only the impact of the structural 
and/or superstructural context and ones that consider only the impacts of social actors. Of 
course, some accounts of the crisis of 2007-08 treat both structural context and the qualities of 
social actors as causes of the crisis. Posner, for example, argues that the ‘two main causes’ of 
the crisis were (a) the way in which financial markets were regulated (structural context) and 
(b) the lack of competency of policy makers (qualities of social actors) (2011, 279). But what 
is missing from Posner’s account – and what is often missing from other literature on the crisis 
– is an explicit understanding of the way in which the events constituting the crisis were also 
part of the causal story and so help to explain the decisions that social actors made. In short, the 
clearer our understanding of what happened and why, the more able we will be to make the 
changes that are required to prevent such a crisis from re-occurring.23 
 
Where does all this leave Bhaskar’s alternative definition of the concept of nexus as ‘a 
combination of aspects (or facets) of an event, etc.’? I suggest that Bhaskar was thinking – 
perhaps unconsciously – of the model of applied or concrete explanation in science, when 
defining the concept of nexus in this way, because this model of explanation, which he 
introduced in Chapter 1 of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, involves, as its first 
and second moments (respectively), the ‘resolution of a complex event (situation, etc.) into its 
components’ and ‘redescription of these components in theoretically significant terms’ 
(Bhaskar 2009, 68). Now, we might ask why we cannot have it both ways: that is, why we 
cannot use the concept of nexus to refer to both a chain of events and ‘a combination of aspects 
(or facets) of an event, etc.’ However, we cannot have it both ways because, when we resolve 
an event into its components and re-describe them theoretically, we are identifying the 
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conjunction of mechanisms that generated that event. These mechanisms may be dialectically 
related such that ‘the form of the combination causally codetermines the elements’ and ‘the 
elements causally codetermine (mutually mediate or condition) each other, and so causally 
codetermine the form’ (Bhaskar 2009, 109). But, if this is the case, we will have ‘a combination 
of structures’ – that is, a ‘“system”’ and not a ‘“nexus”’ (Bhaskar 2009, 109).  
 
This is an appropriate point at which to comment further on the content of Diagrams 2.1 and 
2.2 from Chapter 2 of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, which Bhaskar reproduces 
as Figure 4.1 in ECS. Bhaskar offers little in the way of explanation of the four cases of 
determination of events in Chapter 4 of ECS, and in Chapter 2 of Scientific Realism and Human 
Emancipation he tells us only that ‘[i]n Case II the mechanisms and in Case IV their effects are 
modified. Clearly both may hold simultaneously’ (2009, 109). Now, in my view the crisis at 
Northern Rock is an example of Case IV but it is also an example of Case II because 
underpinning the mechanisms involved are various social structures and systems: for example, 
M1 (international financial trading and lending and borrowing) is the way of working of 
international financial markets, which (it is arguable) are parts of a (capitalist) system of 
dialectically related social structures, and it was the freezing of these markets that disrupted the 
circuit of capital and thereby precipitated a major capitalist crisis of overproduction. 
 
However, the question that arises from examination of Diagrams 2.1 and 2.2 is what Bhaskar 
is attempting to depict in Case I (‘Determination of Events in an Open System’) and Case III 
(‘Multiple Determination of Events’). I suggest that, in Case I, Bhaskar is attempting to depict 
a conjunction of causal mechanisms – that is, the joint determination of events by different 
mechanisms, which is indeed a possibility in an open system; whereas, in Case III, Bhaskar is 
attempting to depict the determination of events in a closed system – that is, the activation of a 
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mechanism that has been isolated from its causal context. Indeed, if this is what Bhaskar was 
attempting to depict in Case II, it might explain the absence of the words ‘Open System’, which 
appear in the description of Cases I, II, and IV. 
 
Moreover, given that, in Case II, Bhaskar depicts a system of mechanisms, which he also refers 
to as an ‘“organic”’ totality in the text, I suggest that, in Case I and Case IV, mechanisms M1 
to M3 are externally related, constituting what Bhaskar refers to in the text as a ‘“mechanical”’ 
complex, the difference between the two being that Case I must be an example of joint 
determination by ‘interacting’ mechanisms in the natural world, whereas Case IV just be an 
example of joint determination by ‘interacting’ mechanisms in the social world (Bhaskar 2009, 
110). I suggest, furthermore, that the addition of M4, in Case IV, indicates that a particular event 
within a nexus of events may be jointly determined and that the dotted line indicates that the 
additional mechanism (M4) does not have the same causal weight as other mechanisms that are 
responsible for determining the same event (M1 in Case IV). Hence, the dotted line from M4 to 
E0, in Case II, indicates the presence of an externally related mechanism, whose effect in the 
joint determination of E0 is less than the effect of the system of ‘intra-acting mechanisms (M1 
to M3) (Bhaskar 2009, 110). This interpretation of Cases II and IV is consistent with Bhaskar’s 
claim in the text that ‘[p]ervasive internality in a system is compatible with differentiated, and 
highly specific, causal roles within it’ (Bhaskar 2009, 111). 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have proposed solutions to a range of conceptual problems that I have detected, 
using the method of immanent critique, in the arguments of ECS, IW, and associated works. Let 
me summarize the nature of these problems and how I have attempted to resolve them. 
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In Section 2, I identified, in Chapter 3 of ECS and Chapter 4 of IW, a problem of confusion 
stemming from the illicit identification of the epistemic fallacy with the epistemological fallacy. 
I argued that the former, the reduction of the concept of being to the concept of knowledge, 
should be distinguished from the latter, the reduction of ontological to epistemological 
questions, but that the latter may be seen as constellationally containing the former. I also 
identified a problem of conceptual confusion stemming from the illicit identification of the 
conceptual pairings intransitivity–transitivity, ontology–epistemology, and being–knowledge, 
in Chapter 3 of ECS and in Chapters 7, 8, and 13 of IW. I argued that, although each pairing is 
a constellational identity, each one should be distinguished from, and thus not identified simply 
with, the others. 
 
In Sections 3 and 4, I identified, in Chapter 1 of ECS, Chapter 4 of IW, and in Hartwig’s work, 
a problem of confusion concerning the conceptualization of the domains of the real, the actual, 
and the subjective. Thus, in Section 3, I argued that confusion concerning the conceptualization 
of the domain of the real stems from the absence of (a) the concept of superstructure, which 
must be distinguished clearly from the concept of structure, and (b) the terms ‘material’, 
‘conceptual’, ‘semiotic’, and ‘empirical’, which allow us to distinguish between, on the one 
hand, different types of causal object and, on the other hand, parts of reality that we can detect 
through the senses and parts that we cannot. I also argued that confusion concerning the 
conceptualization of the domain of the subjective stems from an absence of terms such as 
perceptual, cognitive, emotive, conative, and linguistic, which allow us to distinguish between 
(lower-order) processes of the mind. 
 
In Section 4, I argued that confusion concerning the conceptualization of the domain of the 
actual stems from Hartwig’s illicit identification of the distinction between events and 
This is the accepted version of an article that has been published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of 
Critical Realism and that is available online at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14767430.2019.1600122  
 
experiences and mechanisms with the distinction between the domains of the actual and the 
real. Contra Hartwig, I argued, first, that events are real to the extent that (a) they are outcomes 
of the realization of the properties constituting structures and superstructures and (b) they are 
triggering causes, even though they are not mechanisms; and, second, that events in the social 
world are both triggering and modifying causes to the extent that they are experienced and thus 
mediated by the exercise of human subjectivity. Finally, I argued that the confusion pertaining 
to Bhaskar’s concept of nexus stems from the contradictory definition of it that he presents in 
Chapter 2 of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation and that resolving this contradiction 
helps us to make sense of the four cases of determination of events that are reproduced as Figure 
4.1 in ECS. 
 
In short, in the second article in this series, I have identified, once again, a range of conceptual 
problems – illicit conceptual identification, conceptual absence, and contradictory conceptual 
definition – that generate confusion at the level of philosophical argument. By identifying these 
problems, I hope to have confirmed, once again, Bhaskar’s view, which he states in ECS, that 
‘the development of … critical realism is … a process of continuing self-critique (or 
metacritique)’ (11); and, by proposing solutions to these problems, I hope not only to have 
clarified but also to have developed the categories of original critical realism, so that critical 
realism as a whole can ‘demystify and enlighten common sense’ and thus be a more effective 
underlabourer for science. 
 
Notes 
1. I justify the use of immanent critique, as the starting point for my argument, in endnote 3 in 
the first article in this series. Of course, as one of the reviewers of this article pointed out, my 
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own argument may be subjected to immanent critique so that it too may be found to be 
problematic. But that is to be expected, if one accepts the fallibility of all forms of knowledge, 
including philosophy. 
 
2. One of the reviewers of this article asked whether or not I would have identified the problems 
that I discuss in it, were I to have selected a different set of texts. This is a possibility that I must 
acknowledge. However, the question of which materials to select raises the question of what 
the starting point for my article should be. In my view, the starting point for any immanent 
critique should be one that is justifiable; that is, one should be able to give clear reasons for 
starting at that point. As I pointed out in the introduction to the first article, it is because ECS is 
a ‘summative’ text, bringing together all three of the core elements of the philosophy of critical 
realism, that it is an appropriate starting point for an immanent critique. With all three core 
elements summarized in one place, we can more easily determine whether or not the three 
component parts are coherent, which they must be, if we are to call critical realism a system of 
philosophy with any degree of legitimacy; and I suggest that, determining whether or not they 
are coherent means determining, not only whether or not the individual contents of each core 
element, considered as a whole, are consistent but also whether or not each core element, 
considered as a different component part of the system, is consistent with the others. 
 
In my view, this is a more rigorous way of arguing than the approach that one of the reviewers 
proposed, which is to ‘start by looking at material in context, considering what the whole is 
intended to convey and considering why something might have been phrased in a particular 
way in particular places’. The problem with the latter approach is that meanings are ‘phrased 
in a particular way’ for a reason – one that pertains to our understanding of an object of interest. 
We may try to express that understanding using words, but it is quite possible, if that 
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understanding is underdeveloped, for us to express it in a way that is problematic. The reviewer 
accepts that ‘errors or problems’ can occur in the making of a philosophical argument (just as 
these can occur in the making of a scientific argument) but claims (without justification) that 
‘this is different … [from] attributing fallacies … to the authors.’ However, a fallacy is a type 
of intellectual error – one that we should eliminate from our thinking, if we accept Bhaskar’s 
claim that ‘truth is a good (ceteris paribus)’ (1998, 63). 
 
3. I define the terms ‘original critical realism’ and ‘dialectical critical realism’ in endnote 4 in 
the first article in this series. 
 
4. One of the reviewers of this article seemed to think that my aim is to reconstruct critical 
realism. On the contrary, my aim is much more modest than that – quite simply because a 
reconstruction of critical realism is not required to solve the problems that I have identified 
using the method of immanent critique. 
 
5. Note that, just as it is possible to confuse the terms ‘epistemic’ and ‘epistemological’, so it is 
possible to confuse the terms ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’. For example, in Chapter 7 of IW the 
authors make the valid point that ‘illusions and false beliefs’ are still real because they have an 
effect on us. As they put it,  
 
 illusions and false beliefs are part of the world; thus, we can say that they are 
 ontological. As such, they have the power to affect us. For instance, if someone 
 believes in vampires, they might have certain rituals to protect themselves from 
 vampires, or try to avoid places where they think that vampires reside. (56) 
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However, ‘illusions and false beliefs’ are ontic, not ontological, entities: more precisely, they 
are ontic1 entities since they are part of ‘whatever pertains to being generally’ (Bhaskar 2009, 
37). As we saw in Section 2, to describe something as ontological1 is to say that it falls within 
‘the general (philosophical) theory of being’, whereas to describe something as ontological2 is 
to say that it applies to ‘the transcendental theory constituted by reflection on the 
presuppositions of scientific activities’ (Bhaskar 2009, 36-7; my emphasis). Thus, we might 
refer to the ontological1 concepts of presence and absence and the ontological2 concepts of 
empirical realism and actualism. 
6. In Figure 12.1 (‘Phases in the achievement of interdisciplinarity’) of IW, the authors once 
again appear to treat ontology and epistemology as synonymous with the intransitive and 
transitive domains of science, respectively (124). Similarly, in Chapter 1 of Scientific Realism 
and Human Emancipation, Bhaskar links ontology and epistemology to the intransitive and 
transitive dimensions of science, claiming that the  
 
 distinction between … ontology and epistemology, implies a distinction between the 
 intransitive, normally knowledge-independent, real objects of scientific knowledge 
 and the transitive, socio-historical, processes of the production of the knowledge of 
 such objects, and accordingly between what I have termed the intransitive dimension 
 [ID] and the transitive dimension [TD] in the philosophy of science. (2009, 24) 
 
However, it is specific positions in ontology and epistemology – namely, transcendental realism 
in ontology and relativism in epistemology – that imply the distinction between the intransitive 
and transitive dimensions of science, not the distinction between ontology and epistemology, 
which is a distinction within the philosophy of science. It has to be the specific positions of 
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transcendental realism and relativism because other positions associated with other 
philosophies – for example, empiricism and idealism – cannot sustain a distinction between an 
intransitive and transitive dimension.  
7. Notice that, in his second claim, Hartwig refers to ‘epistemological process’; however, for 
reasons that should be apparent from the argument of Section 3 of the first article in this series, 
it makes more sense to refer to epistemic process, as well as to social process, when defining 
the transitive dimension of science. 
8. One of the reviewers of this article claimed that a ‘sympathetic reading in toto’ would reveal 
‘that both Bhaskar and Hartwig are quite aware and have conveyed that science is a social 
practice subject to social reproduction, and so do not endorse knowledge as science, as only an 
epistemological process’. Both Bhaskar and Hartwig do indeed demonstrate this understanding 
of science. For example, 
• in the introduction to A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar tells us that his ‘overall 
argument’ is ‘that knowledge must be viewed as a produced means of production and 
science as an ongoing social activity in a continuing process of transformation’ (2008a, 
17) – a conception of science that is echoed by Hartwig, who writes that ‘the TD … 
refers to the ongoing social process of production of knowledge by means of knowledge 
in any practice or field of inquiry, a process to which the TMSA – as to any social 
activity – applies’ (2007, 264); 
• when justifying use of the method of transcendental reasoning in The Possibility of 
Naturalism, Bhaskar refers to ‘the possibility … of posing transcendental questions of 
the form “what must be the case for ϕ to be possible?” for social practices other than 
science’ (1998, 7); 
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• in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, Bhaskar refers to one of ‘two essential 
theorems of the transcendental realist account of science’ as ‘the social production of 
knowledge (TD continuity)’ (2009, 92); 
• and in Dialectic, Bhaskar writes that ‘the concept of the transitive dimension should be 
metacritically extended to incorporate the whole material and cultural infra-/intra-
superstructure of society’ (2008b, 218) – a conception of science that presupposes that 
its conditions of possibility are not limited to social structures but include social 
superstructures (as I defined these in the third section of the first article in this series). 
However, the point I am making is that the understanding that science cannot be reduced to an 
epistemic process is implicit in the understanding that it is a social practice – since knowledge 
is a property of a person and social practices depend for their existence on people – but that this 
understanding is contradicted by use of the term ‘knowledge’ as a synonym for the transitive 
dimension of science – since this usage presupposes that the process of scientific inquiry is only 
epistemic. 
In fact, the conception of knowledge that Bhaskar expresses in A Realist Theory of Science and 
The Possibility of Naturalism is at times contradictory. In the former work, as we have seen, 
Bhaskar tells us that knowledge is ‘a produced means of production’; however, in the latter 
work he tells us that ‘knowledge … must be viewed as a social process irreducible to a purely 
individual acquisition’ (1998, 114). Now, following the logic of the Transformational Model 
of Social Activity, we ought to say that it is the production of knowledge, not knowledge per 
se, that is a social (and epistemic) process, the outcome of which is new knowledge and one of 
the conditions for which is pre-existing knowledge. 
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9. In the Introduction to A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar refers to ‘a transitive dimension, 
in which the object is the material cause or antecedently established knowledge which is used 
to generate the new knowledge’ (2008a, 17). 
10. I say that Bhaskar ‘comes close to treating being and knowledge as synonyms’ because the 
sequence of sentences in the relevant passage is such that one cannot make this interpretation 
with full confidence. One can say, at most, that Bhaskar does not distinguish clearly between 
the conceptual pairings ‘intransitive–transitive’, ‘ontology–epistemology’ and ‘being–
knowledge’.  
By contrast, at one point in The Formation of Critical Realism, Bhaskar does use the terms 
‘ontology’ and ‘being’ and ‘reality’ synonymously. In Chapter 6, he tells us that ‘there is the 
level of ontology as such, the whole domain of ontology, of being and reality’ (Bhaskar and 
Hartwig 2010, 130). If Bhaskar had referred to the whole theory of being and reality, he would 
have avoided making this mistake. 
From a comparison of these two examples, we may conclude that, whether the conceptual 
pairings in question are treated synonymously or not, there is always a real possibility that they 
will be treated in this way, at least if we have not understood how they differ in meaning. 
11. For example, in Chapter 1 of ECS Bhaskar refers to ‘the substantive ontological distinctions 
between (i) open and closed systems and (ii) structures and events or what I call the domain of 
the real and the domain of the actual’ (7). Likewise, in Chapter 4 of IW the authors write:  
 
 It is only possible to make sense of experimental activity if one assumes that the 
 structures and mechanisms identified inside the laboratory nevertheless continue to 
 exist and act outside the laboratory. This means that real structures and mechanisms 
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 cannot be reduced to actual patterns of events and constant conjunctions as measured 
 inside the laboratory. Therefore, one has to differentiate between the domain of the 
 real and the domain of the actual’ (29). 
 
12. In ECS, Bhaskar continues to refer to the domain of the empirical – for example, in Table 
1.1 (7). He also refers to it, when explaining the principle of ‘Intransitivity’ in Chapter 3, where 
his intention is to establish the non-identity of reality and ‘knowledge, experience or any other 
human attribute or product’ (47). However, as we shall see, it makes more sense to refer to the 
domain of the subjective rather than the domain of the empirical because the term ‘empirical’ 
has a more limited meaning than the term ‘subjective’ and knowledge and experience are 
properties of a person (47). 
13. See Table 1.1 in Bhaskar (2008a, 56). 
14. Hence, both rationalism and empiricism presuppose the ontology of ‘anthroporealism’ 
(Bhaskar 2008b, 394). See also the entry ‘anthropism’ in Hartwig (2007, 40-1). 
15. See Table 37 in Hartwig (2007, 401). Again, it is not surprising that Hartwig should have 
included signs within the domain of the subjective because the philosophy of social 
constructivism, according to which social reality is constituted through language, has been 
another object of immanent critique in the work of critical realists. (See, for example, Sayer 
[2000].) Including signs within the domain of the subjective demonstrates, by virtue of the 
distinction between the domains of the real and the subjective, that social reality encompasses 
more than just language.  
16. Note that, given the argument of Section 2 (about the non-identity of the conceptual pairings 
ontology–epistemology and intransitivity–transitivity), ‘epistemological’ should not be treated 
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as synonymous with ‘transitive’ and ‘ontological’ should not be treated as synonymous with 
‘intransitive’. 
17. One of the reviewers of this article pointed out that thinking of events as causes is ‘implicit 
… in any process view of the world’. Indeed, it is; and in thinking about process, and by 
implication change, we enter the realm of dialectical critical realism. However, to the extent 
that this understanding of causation is taken for granted in dialectical critical realism and to the 
extent that it is a development of original critical realism – preserving what are the essential 
ideas of original critical realism – logic compels us to revise the explicit (that is, expressed) 
understanding of causation that we find in works of original critical realism to ensure that these 
are consistent with that which we find in works of dialectical critical realism. As I pointed out 
in the first article, it would not be fair to assume that all critical realists have either identified 
this inconsistency or resolved it. (See endnote 2 in the first article.) 
18. Figure 4.1 in ECS is an amalgamation of Diagrams 2.1 and 2.2 in Scientific Realism and 
Human Emancipation. (See Bhaskar 2009, 110.) 
19. As Bhaskar puts it in the first section of Chapter 2 of Scientific Realism and Human 
Emancipation, ‘the modulation of effects within a nexus may affect the modus operandi of the 
mechanisms themselves’ (2009, 109). 
20. In February 2008, given the lack of interest from the private sector in buying the bank, 
Northern Rock was nationalized. 
21. The Financial Services Authority announced, during the crisis, that 100 per cent of retail 
deposits up to a value of £35,000 would be eligible for compensation, later increasing the 
compensation limit to £50,000. 
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22. See House of Commons Treasury Committee (2008). 
23. I make this point because one of the reviewers of this article asked me to draw out the 
implications of my argument for the practice of social science. However, the implications of an 
understanding of the principles of original and dialectical critical realism for the practice of 
social science will also be addressed in the fourth article in this series, which is concerned with 
developing a critical realist approach to interdisciplinary research on human wellbeing. 
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